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STATUTES AND RULES
Statutes.
1,

/ U A - H - 1 0 2{ J | ia I .

I Except as otherwise provided in Section 70A-91
on excluded transactions, this chapter applies;
(A) To any transaction (regardless of
its form) which is intended to create a
security interest i n persona] property or
fixtures
including
goods,
documents,
instruments,
general
intangibles,
chattel
paper of accounts; and a is - .

2.

Utah Code Ann. §70A-9-503.
70A-9-503.
Secured party's
possession after default.

r ight t o

take

Unless otherwise agreed a secured party
has on default the right to take possession of
the collateral.
in taking possession a
secured party may proceed without judicial
process if this can be done without breach of
the peace or may proceed by action. ...
3 .

' '1 ill > " o d n

Alii I

k '• i A - '*•• •*" .

70A-9-507. Secured party'
to comply with this nart

lability for failure

If it
established that the
secured party is not proceeding in accordance
with the provisions of this part, disposition
may be ordered or restrained on appropriate
terms and conditions. If the disposition has
occurred, the debtor, or any person entitled
to notificati on or whose security interest has
been made known to the secured party prior to
the disposition has a right to recover from
the secured party any loss caused by a failure
to comply with the provisions of this part.
If the collateral is consumer goods, the
debtor has a right to recover in any event an
amount not less than the credit service charge
plus 10% of the principal amount of the debt
or the time/price differential plus 10% of the
cash price, ...
4.

Utah Code Ami. §/6-JL*-«*U
3

78-12-40.
merits.

Effect of failure of action not on

If any action is commenced within due
time and a judgment thereon for the plaintiff
is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in such
action or upon a cause of action otherwise
than upon the merits, and the time limited
either by law or contract for commencing the
same shall have expired, the plaintiff, or if
he dies and the cause of action survives, his
representatives, may commence a new action
within one year after the reversal or failure.
5.

Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56 (1986).
78-27-56. Attorney's fees—Award where action
or defense in bad faith—Exceptions.
(1) In civil actions, the court shall
award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court determines that the
action or defense to the action was without
merit and not brought or asserted in good
faith, except under Subsection (2).
(2) The court, in its discretion, may
award no fees or limited fees against a party
under Subsection (1), but only if the court:
(a) finds the party has filed
an affidavit of impecuniosity in the
action before the court; or
(b) the court enters in the
record the reason for not awarding
fees
under
the
provisions
of
Subsection (1).

Rules.
1.

Rule 8(c) and (f) Utah R. Civ. P.
(c) Affirmative defenses. In pleading to
a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth
affirmatively
accord
and
satisfaction,
arbitration and award, assumption of risk,
contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow
servant, laches, license, payment, release,
res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of
limitations, waiver, and any other matter
constituting an avoidance or affirmative
defense.
When a party has mistakenly
4

designated a defense as a counterclaim or a
counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms,
if justice so requires, shall treat the
pleadings as if there had been a proper
designation.
(f) Construction of pleadings.
All
pleadings shall be so construed as to do
substantial justice.
2.

Rule 12(h) Utah R. Civ. P.

Waiver of defenses.

A
party
waives
all
defenses
and
objections which he does not present either by
motion, as herein before provided or, if he
has made no motion, in his Answer or Reply,
except
(1) that the defense of failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted, the
defense of failure to join an indispensable
party, and the objection to state a legal
defense to a claim may also be made by a later
pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion
for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial
on the merits, and except
(2) That, whenever
it appears by
suggestion of the parties or otherwise that
the Court lacks jurisdiction of the subject
matter, the Court shall dismiss the action.
The objection or defense, if made at trial,
shall be disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b)
in the light of any evidence that may have
been received.
3.

Rule 15(b) Utah R. Civ. P.

(b) Amendments
to conform
to the
evidence.
When issues not raised by the
pleadings are tried by express or implied
consent of the parties, they shall be treated
in all respects as if they had been raised in
the pleadings.
Such amendments of the
pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to
conform to the evidence and to raise these
issues may be made upon motion of any party at
any time, even after judgment; but failure so
to amend does not affect the result of the
trial of these issues.
If evidence is
objected to at the trial on the ground that it
is not within the issues made by the
pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings
to be amended when the presentation of the
merits of the action will be subserved thereby
5

and the objecting party fails to satisfy the
court that the admission of such evidence
would prejudice him in maintaining his action
or defense upon the merits. The court shall
grant a continuance, if necessary, to enable
the objection party to meet such evidence.
4.
Rule
objection.

51

Utah.

R.

Civ.

P.

Instructions

At the close of the evidence or at such
earlier time as the Court reasonably directs,
any party may file written requests that the
Court instruct the jury on the law as set
forth in said request. The Court shall inform
counsel of its proposed action upon the
requests prior to instructing the jury; and it
shall furnish counsel with a copy of its
proposed instructions, unless the parties
stipulate that such instructions may be given
orally or otherwise waive this requirement.
If the instructions are to be given in
writing, all objections thereto must be made
before the instructions are given to the jury;
otherwise, objections may be made to the
instructions after they are given to the jury,
but before the jury retires to consider its
verdict.
No party may assign as error the
giving or the failure to give an instruction
unless he objects thereto. In objecting to
the giving of an instruction, a party must
state distinctly the matter to which he
objects and the grounds for his objection.
Notwithstanding the foregoing requirement, the
appellate Court, in its discretion and in the
interests of justice, may review the giving of
or failure to give an instruction. Opportunity
shall be given to make objections, and they
shall be made out of the hearing of the jury.
Arguments for the respective parties
shall be made after the Court has instructed
the jury. The Court shall not comment on the
evidence in the case, and if the Court states
any of the evidence, it must instruct the
jurors that they are the exclusive judges of
all questions of fact.

6

to

jury;

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF CASE

On November 5, 1987, the Plaintiffs, Richard and Shirley
Moffitt,

(Moffitts) brought suit against Barr to recover the

damages they had sustained as a result of Barr/s wrongful repossession of their 1975 Kenworth truck,

Richard Moffitt sued Barr

for assault and battery because of an altercation which took place
during the repossession during which Barr threatened Moffitt with
a gun.

In addition, Moffitt sued the Defendant for trespass to

chattels, conversion, fraud, and violation of UCC Article 9,
because he claimed a substantial interference in his ownership
rights to the truck as a result of the repossession.
The Plaintiff, Shirley Moffitt, sued Barr for intentional
infliction of emotional distress for the damages she suffered as a
result of witnessing her husband threatened with a gun.
Barr counterclaimed with charges that the Moffitt's Complaint
constituted an abuse of process and also countersued the Plaintiff,
Richard Moffitt, for assault and battery in connection with the
altercation.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION

1.

The Moffitts filed their Complaint against Barr on

November 5, 1987. As set forth above, the Moffitts claimed damages
for assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
trespass to chattels, conversion, fraud and violation of UCC
Article 9.

7

2.

Barr filed an Answer and Counterclaim on December 23,

1987, Barr asserted counterclaims of assault, battery and abuse of
process.
3. Barr filed an Amended Answer and Counterclaim on February
26, 1988. In his Answer, Barr included various additional defenses
but did not include the defense of "self-defense11.

His Counter-

claims remained the same.
4. On January 3, 1990, the Moffitts filed a Motion to Dismiss
Barr's Second and Third Counterclaims of assault and battery on the
grounds that they had not been filed within the relevant statute of
limitations.

The Court ruled on Moffitts7 Motion on February 12,

1990 and dismissed E*arr's Second and Third Counterclaims
5.

On December 14, 1989, Barr filed a Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment requesting that Moffitts' fourth and fifth causes
of action of conversion and trespass to chattels be dismissed. The
Court granted Barr's Motion and dismissed the claims of conversion
and trespass for chattels.
6.

The case was set for a trial by jury on June 11, 1990.

Prior to the start of trial, the Moffitts filed a Motion in Limine
which

requested

that the Court restrict Barr

from producing

evidence or argument concerning the defense of "self-defense"
because it had not been pled in the Barr's Answer.
Motion In Limine was granted.

The Moffitts7

The Court did, however, authorize

Barr to tell his side of the story concerning the incident in
question but did not authorize him to argue "self-defense" to the
jury.
8

7.

The case was tried before a jury on June 11, 1990 and the

jury returned with a verdict in favor of Richard Moffitt. The jury
awarded Moffitt compensatory damages in the amount of $7000.00 and
punitive damages in the amount of $9000.00.

After the jury had

been released, Barr made a Motion Notwithstanding the Verdict and
asked for a reduction of the award of punitive and compensatory
damages.
8.

The Court denied Defendants' Motion.
Judgment against Barr was entered pursuant to the jury

verdict on June 14, 1990. Thereafter, the Defendant filed Motions
for a New Trial, To Vacate Judgment and for Amendment of Judgment.
All of Defendant's Motions were thereafter denied by the Court.
9.

The Defendant filed his Notice of Appeal on or about

September 24, 1990.
C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1.

During the year 1981, Richard Moffitt purchased a 1975

Kenworth truck, VIN144540S. Moffitt used this truck as a long haul
truck driver and the truck constituted his sole source of income.
(Trial Transcript p. 8; Affidavit of Richard Moffitt, p. 59, Court
file).
2.

In May or April or 1984, Mr. Moffitt leased his truck to

Jim Jeffries and worked for him as a driver.

(Trial Transcript pp.

7-10).
3. During April of 1984, the engine in Moffitt's truck failed
and necessitated repairs costing $13,000.00. (Affidavit of Richard
Moffitt, Court file p. 59, Trial Transcript p. 21).
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4.

In order

to

finance

the

repairs, Moffitt

obtained

financial assistance from Mr. Jeffries. In order to assure the repayment of such assistance, Moffitt gave Jeffries the title to his
truck to hold as security.

In order to do so, Moffitt signed the

title to Jeffries in blank. At no time did Moff itt intend or agree
to give Jeffries his truck.

(Affidavit of Richard Moffitt, Court

file p. 60).
5.

After Moffitt had given Jeffries the title to his truck,

Jeffries sold the truck to Chopping Motors Company in Wyoming.
(Affidavit of Richard Moffitt, Court file p. 60).
6.

Moffitt was not aware that the truck had been sold and at

no time had given his permission for the same.

He continued in

possession of the truck until November 5, 1984 when the Defendant
took the truck from him.

(Affidavit of Richard Moff itt p. 60,

Trial Transcript pp. 8-11).
7.

During the period from April 1984 until November 1984,

Moffitt drove the truck for Jeffries.

During such time, Jeffries

did not ask for the return of the truck nor did he ever tell
Moffitt that he was not to have the truck.

(Trial Transcript pp.

11 and 12).
8.

On November 6, 1984 at approximately midnight, Barr and

his employees came to the Moffitts' home in West Valley City with
a wrecker truck to take the 1975 Kenworth truck from Moffitt.
Moffitt was awakened by the noise and went outside to see what was
happening.

(Trial Transcript p. 13).
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9.

Upon leaving the house, Moffitt found that the wrecker

operator was hooking chains to the back of his truck.

Upon

confronting the wrecker driver as to what was happening, the driver
stated "we are taking, or repossessing, this truck".

(Trial

Transcript p. 16).
10.

At the time of the repossession, the truck had been

parked in front of the Moffitt residence for three to four days.
Moffitt was in between runs and had been asked to haul another load
that day.

(Trial Transcript p. 17).

11. Moffitt had not been informed prior to this time that his
truck was to be taken nor did he have any notice that his truck was
to be removed.
12.

(Trial Transcript p. 17).

After Moffitt had talked with the wrecker driver, he met

with Barr. Barr indicated that the truck was being repossessed on
orders from Jim Jeffries. Moffitt stated that Jeffries did not own
the truck and could not take the vehicle. In response, Barr stated
that he had Repossession Order and showed Moffitt some papers.
Barr also stated that he was an officer of the law and showed
Moffitt a badge and I.D.
13.

(Trial Transcript pp. 19, 20 and 29).

After Barr had shown Moffitt the alleged Repossession

Order, Moffitt entered the driver's side of the truck and sat down
in the driver's seat.
Moffitt

and

ended

up

Barr followed and climbed over the top of
sitting with his

legs across Moffitt.

Thereafter, he attempted to shove Moffitt out of the truck. (Trial
Transcript pp. 24-26).
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14.

When

Barr's

efforts

to

dislodge

Moffitt

proved

unsuccessful, Barr pulled a gun, cocked it, and put it to Moffitt's
head, telling him in no uncertain words to leave the truck because
he was not going to fight with him.

(Trial Transcript pp. 25 and

26) .
15.

At the time Barr held the gun to his head, Moffitt felt

as though he was going to be shot and was scared.

Mrs. Moffitt,

who was standing on the ground outside of the truck, was a witness
to what was happening and went into hysterics.

(Trial Transcript

pp. 26 and 27).
16.

As a result of his wife's pleadings, Moffitt left the

truck. At the time, Moffitt felt sick because he didn't know what
to do. He didn't have any money and didn't have a job anymore. He
did not sleep that night.
17.

(Trial Transcript pp. 27 and 28).

Barr subsequently took the truck and left.

(Trial

Transcript pp. 27, 28).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Moffitts oppose Barr's arguments as follows:
1•

Barr waived his right to claim "self-defense".

The

District Court properly ruled on all matters touching on Barr's
claim of self-defense.

First, the Court correctly dismissed

Barr's second and third counterclaims of assault and battery
because they had not been timely filed. Second, the Court properly
granted Moffitts' Motion In Limine to exclude evidence, argument
and instructions relating to "self-defense" because Barr had failed
to plead the same in his answer.
12

Third, Barr's counterclaims of

assault and battery cannot be considered a substitute for the
affirmative defense of "self-defense" pursuant to Rule 8(c) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure because "self-defense" was not
mistakenly pled as a counterclaim.

Fourth, the Court properly

refused to instruct the jury on "self-defense" because of Barr's
failure to plead the same, his failure to object to the Court's
refusal to do so after the close of evidence, and his failure to
make a motion to conform the pleadings to the evidence as set forth
in Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
2.

The jury verdict was supported by substantial evidence.

The jury properly considered Moffitt's fear, anxiety, nervous
shock, humiliation, and injury to his personal feelings in awarding
damages. Richard Moffitt presented substantial evidence to support
his claim for damages and the amount awarded was not excessive or
the result of passion or prejudice.
3.

Barr is not entitled to an award of attorney fees.

Barr cannot recover attorney fees under UCA 78-27-56 because
the Moffitts' claims were properly grounded in law and fact and
were not brought in bad faith.
of

Additionally, Barr's Counterclaim

abuse of process was volunatrily

dismissed

and therefore

prevents him from raising the issue.
ARGUMENT
I.

BARR WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO CLAIM "SELF-DEFENSE"

Barr argues that the Court erred in refusing to allow him to
advance the defense of "self-defense" and supports his argument on
the following grounds:
13

1.

The Court improperly dismissed his counterclaims of

assault and battery;
2.

The Court improperly granted the Moffitts7 Motion In

Limine and restricted him from arguing or advancing "self-defense";
3.

The Court erred in not allowing a "self-defense" jury

instruction.
As will be set forth hereafter, it was Barr himself who failed
to properly raise "self-defense" in this case and the Moffitts
should not be penalized for Barr's neglect.
BARR#S COUNTERCLAIMS OF ASSAULT AND BATTERY WERE
PROPERLY DISMISSED

A.

As set forth in the Statement of Facts, the incident which
gave

rise

to

this

action

took

place

on

November

5, 1984.

Subsequent thereto (February 14, 1985), the Moffitts filed suit
against Barr alleging the commission of assault, battery and other
torts.

This suit was dismissed on December 11, 1986 because of

jurisdictional problems.

At no time during the pendency of this

first action did Barr assert his counterclaims of assault and
battery.
On November 5, 1987, almost one year after their prior action
had been dismissed, the Moffitts filed the instant action.

Barr

filed counterclaims of assault and battery on December 23, 1987,
over three years after the incident had occurred.

Because the

statute of limitations for assault and battery is one year, (UCA
78-12-29(4)), Barr's counterclaims were clearly time barred.
Even if the statute of limitations was stayed as Barr argues
pursuant to the rationale set forth in Doxey-Layton Company v.
14

Clark, 548 P. 2d 902, 906 (Utah 1976), the one year statute of
limitations

would

still

prevent

Barr

from

presenting

his

counterclaims because a total period of over one year had elapsed
before Barr's claims were filed, during which there was no action
was pending.

This time period is calculated as follows:
PERIOD

ELAPSED TIME

Date of Incident (November 5, 1984) to
date first action filed (February 14, 1985)

101 Days

Date First Action Dismissed (December 11,
1986) until present action filed (November 5,
1987)

329 Days

TOTAL

430 Days
1 Year 65 Days

Based on the above, there is nothing in the law which excuses
the Defendant's late filing. Accordingly, the Defendant's counterclaims of assault and battery were untimely filed, and properly
dismissed.
B.
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION IN LIMINE WAS TIMELY FILED
AND WELL GROUNDED
A Motion

In Limine

is generally made before or at the

beginning of a jury trial for a Protective Order against prejudicial evidence, argument and the like.

"It serves the useful

purpose of raising and pointing out before trial certain evidenciary rulings the Court may be called upon to make during the
course of trial".

Lussier v. Mau Van Development, Inc., 1, 667

P.2d 804 (Ha. App. 1983).

A Motion In Limine is addressed to the

discretion of the Court and will not be reversed in the absence of
an abuse of discretion.

Equitable Life v. Cedarbrook, Inc., 761

P.2d 77, 81 (Wash. App. 1988).
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In the present case, Barr has raised two objections to the
Moffitts' Motion In Limine, namely, (1) that the Moffitts failed to
object to evidence concerning "self-defense", and (2) Barr had pled
"self-defense" in his answer - through his counterclaims of assault
and battery.

Neither of Barr's arguments can be sustained for the

following reasons:
!•

The Moffitts timely objected to any evidence or argument

concerning self-defense.
In ruling on the Moffitts7 Motion In Limine, Judge Brian
stated:
THE COURT: The Motion In Limine, unlike other dispossitive motions, may be brought at any time during the
proceedings.
The Court finds that those motions are
routinely brought during trial, in many, many cases.
They are designed to define issues, to expedite the legal
proceedings, and they are appropriate at any time during
the proceedings.
The Court finds that the Defendant has not plead selfdefense in the Answer or other responsive pleadings. The
Court finds that there has been ample time, from the date
the Complaint was filed until the date of trial, to amend
the pleadings. The Plaintiff may have been suspicious
that a defense of self-defense would be asserted. However, failure to plead self-defense in the Defendant's
Answer is a barr to that defense at this time.
The Plaintiffs' Motion In Limine to preclude the
Defendant from presenting testimony regarding the issue
of self-defense is granted. The Defendant is ordered not
to produce evidence or argument concerning self-defense.
The Defendant is certainly entitled to explain the events
surrounding the alleged assault and battery and the
intentional infliction of emotional distress, as asserted
by the Plaintiffs. However, the issue of self-defense is
not legally to be advanced in these proceedings, nor is
it to be submitted to the Jury by way of instruction or
verdict form.
MR. CASTON: Question of clarification, Your Honor. I
would rather ask now then be instructed for a bench
conference later.
The way I understand the Court's
16

ruling, Mr. Barr may explain why he did what he did, is
that correct?
THE COURT:
explanation.
submitted nor
his behavior
Transcript).

The Defendant is entitled to offer an
Legally, there is to be no verdict form
jury instructions to the jury, establishing
as a legal defense.
(pps. 64-65, Trial
(emphasis added).

As set forth above, the Court allowed Barr to explain the
events surrounding the incident but was ordered not to advance the
theory of self-defense or submit an instruction to the jury.
Because of the Court's ruling, the Moffitts did not object to the
testimony elicited from Barr concerning his recollection of the
events.

Furthermore, "objections need not be renewed if the prior

ruling on the Motion In Limine amounted to an unequivocal holding
concerning the issue raised. ... Where a hearing was held, counsel
presented legal arguments, and the trial court ruled whether or not
the challenged evidence would be admitted at trial, there is no
necessity of further objection... ." Lussier, 667 P.2d 804 at 826.
Because Judge Brian's ruling constituted an unequivocal order
and the ruling was made after the presentation of legal arguments
by counsel, the Moffitts were under no duty or obligation to object
to Barr's testimony concerning the events, as seen by him,.
2.

Barr waived the affirmative defense of "self-defense.

The Court properly granted the Moffitts' Motion In Limine
because the affirmative defense of "self-defense" had been waived.
Rule 12(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "a
party waives all defenses and objections which he does not present
either by motion or... in his answer and reply... ."

Since the

Defendant did not plead the defense of "self-defense" in his
17

The Plaintiffs7 Motion In Limine

Amended Answer, it was waived.

was therefore a proper devise to exclude any evidence or argument
concerning "self-defense" from the jury.

(A copy of the Moffitts'

Motion In Limine is attached as Exhibit "A").
3.

Rule 8(c) URCP does not apply to this case.

Barr claims that pursuant to Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, he has pleaded the defense of "self-defense" by
way of his counterclaims of assault and battery.

Such an argument

is insupportable because at the time of trial, Barr's counterclaims were not before the Court. The counterclaims of assault and
battery had been dismissed in April of 1990 pursuant to Moffitts'
Motion for Summary Judgment.
Even if Rule 8(c) were somehow construed to be applicable to
this case, it would not provide Barr the relief he seeks. In order
for a counterclaim to be construed as an affirmative defense under
Rule 8(c), it must be shown that the party mistakenly designated
the

defense

counterclaims

as

a counterclaim.

shows

affirmative defense.

that

Barr

A
did

plain
not

reading

intend

to

of

Barr's

plead

an

The counterclaims only seek the recovery of

damages and they do not, in any way, state or imply that Barr's
conduct was excused by that of Richard Moffitt. Furthermore, Barr
has not indicated that he mistakenly designated the defense of
"self-defense" as the counter-claims of assault and battery.

(A

copy of the Defendant's Amended Answer and Counterclaim is attached
as Exhibit "B").
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C.

THE COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO INSTRUCT THE
JURY ON "SELF-DEFENSE"

Barr seeks to amend his Answer to include the defense of
"self-defense" pursuant to Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Rule 15(b) provides:

"when issues not raised by the

pleadings are tried by the express or implied consent of the
parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been
raised in the pleadings".

(emphasis added).

Contrary to Barr's

argument, there is absolutely nothing in the record to show that
the issue of "self-defense" was expressly or implicitly tried. The
Moffitts' Motion In Limine and the arguments rendered in support
thereof clearly show that the issue of self-defense was not
expressly or implicitly tried.
Significantly, Barr never did make a motion after the close of
evidence to conform the pleadings to the evidence. Had he done so,
Judge Brian would have had an opportunity to correct any errors
before instructing the jury. In addition, Barr failed to object to
the instructions which were given to the jury and the Court's
failure to instruct regarding "self-defense". Pursuant to Rule 51
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "if the instructions are to
be given in writing, all objections thereto must be made before the
instructions are given to the jury; ...no party may assign as error
the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he objects
thereto".

(emphasis added)

As set forth in the rule, objections to instructions, or the
Court's failure to instruct, should be made before the jury retires
for deliberation.

The purpose for this rule "is that if the
19

objections call attention to error, correction may be made before
the jury goes to deliberate.

This is the primary function of

objections, and it is not simply to lay a foundation for possible
reversal by the losing party... ". (emphasis added).

Hill v.

Cloward, 14 Utah 2d 55, 377 P.2d 186, 188 (Utah 1962).

The

Defendant's failure to timely object constitutes a waiver of his
"instruction" argument.

Jensen v. Eakins. 575 P.2d 179 (Utah

1978).
II.

THE JURY VERDICT WAS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

In awarding damages for assault, a jury may properly consider
the Plaintiffs fear, anxiety, indignity, disgrace, nervous shock,
shame, humiliation and injury to his personal feelings, among other
things. Marbel v. Jensen, 53 Utah 226, 229, 178 P. 66 (Utah 1919);
Dixon v. Snyder, 340 P.2d 125 (Colo. 1959).

In the instant case,

the Court properly instructed the jury on the issue of damages.
Instruction No. 20 requests that the jury compensate the Plaintiff,
Richard

Moffitt,

embarrassment,
sustained.
»C").

for

any

humiliation

emotional
or

loss

distress, fear, anxiety,
of

reputation

which

he

(A copy of Instruction No. 20 is attached as Exhibit

Contrary to Barr's argument, a substantial

amount of

evidence was presented to the jury in support of Moffitts' claim
for damages.

During his direct examination, Richard Moffitt

testified as follows:
Q:

What did he do after coming across you?

A:

He told me he is not going to fight with me, and he
pulled a gun from back here, and cocked it, and put
it to my head, and told me in no uncertain words
that he was not going to fight with me.
20

Did the gun ever touch you?
Not that I realized, no, not that I remember.
it was here.

But

How do you know?
From the street light, or the light that was in the
neighbor's yard, shines through the windows, I seen
the flash of the gun. I knew it was an automatic.
I knew it was cocked. I knew where he was pointing
it.
How do you know it was cocked?
Because I heard it being cocked.
* * *

Did he touch you at any time?
He was sitting on top of me. His legs were across me,
trying to shove me out of the truck. My hands were on
the steering wheel. I looked straight ahead and told him
he was not taking the truck.
My wife was outside,
screaming to let them have it.
She went hysterical
because of the gun. I didn't want them to take my truck.
It was mine. You don't understand it, I guess.
You mentioned Mr. Barr had touched you, I believe
crawling over you. Did he touch you at any other time?
He was trying to shove me out of the truck, out of the
seat and out the door.
Was he doing that when he had the gun to your head?
Yes.
At this time, how did you feel, Richard?
I felt I was going to get shot.
Were you scared?
Yes.
Did you feel that Mr. Barr intended to make good with
that threat?
Yes, I did.

(Trial Transcript pp. 25-27)
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* * *

Q:

What did you do after the gun had been pulled?

A:

I just kept telling him he wasn't taking it. Fear of
being shot and going into hysterics is — I just gave up,
and I got out of the truck. I couldn't see her going
through it any more.

Q:

Richard, Mr. Barr's conduct of climbing over you, pulling
the gun, putting it to your head, was that offensive to
you?

A:

Of course, it was.

Q:

At that time, how did you feel? What were your feelings?

A:

A little bit sick, because I didn't know what to do. I
didn't have any money, and I didn't have a job anymore.

Q:

Did you sleep at all that night?

A:

No.

(Trial Transcript pp. 27-28)
The testimony was clear that as a result of having a gun
placed at his head, the Plaintiff, Richard Moffitt, suffered fear
for his life, loss of sleep and anxiety. All of these factors are
properly compensable in assault cases.

Barr failed to object to

Instruction No. 20 and should not now be allowed to complain when
the jury did as they were instructed.
III. THE DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY
FEES
In order for Barr to be awarded attorney fees under §78-27-56
of the Utah Code, the following matters must be established:
1.

The party awarded fees must be the prevailing party;

2.

The Court must determine that the action or defense was

without merit;
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3.

The Court must determine that the action or def ense was

not brought in good faith.
In the Utah case of Cady v. Johnson, 671 P. 2d 149, (Utah
1983), the Utah Supreme Court defined the terms set forth in §7827-56 as follows:
A.

"WITHOUT MERIT":

The term implies bordering on frivolity. The dictionary
definition of "frivolous" is "of little weight or
importance having no basis in law or fact". (emphasis
added) Id. at p. 151.
B.

"GOOD FAITH"

In addition to finding the claims to lack merit, the
trial court must also find that Plaintiff's conduct in
bringing suit was lacking good faith.
In Tacoma Association of Creditmen v. Lester, 72 Wash. 2d 453,
458; 433 P.2d 901, 904 (Wa. 1967), the Court defined "good
faith" as:
(1) an honest belief in the propriety of the activities
in question;
(2) no intent to take unconscionable advantage of others;
(3) no intent to, or knowledge of the fact that the
activities in question enter, delay or defraud others.
To establish lack of good faith, one must prove that one or
more of these factors is lacking. Sparkman v. McClean Company
and Derber. 4 Wash. App. 341, 481 P.2d 585, (Wash. 1971)".
Id. at p.151.
In the instant case, Barr has failed to meet the standards set
forth in Cady and §78-27-56 for the following reasons:
1.

Barr was not the prevailing party.

Barr cannot recover his attorney fees under UCA §78-27-56
because he was not the "prevailing party".
damages in favor of Richard Moffitt, not Barr.
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The jury awarded

2.

The Moffitts' claims were properly grounded in law and

fact.
The following review of the Moffitts' causes of action will
show that they were properly grounded in law and fact.
A.

Conversion - Trespass to Chattels:

The Defendant alleges that Plaintiff's actions for conversion
and trespass to chattels were improper because the Defendant did
not "own" the truck.

Such causes of action, however, are well

grounded in the law because, "the theft of goods or chattels does
not divest one who owns, or has title to such property from his
ownership of the property; the owner may follow and reclaim the
stolen goods wherever he finds them."

63 Am. Jur. Property, §44.

The sale by a thief does not vest title in the purchaser or against
the owner even though the sale was made in the ordinary course of
business and the purchaser acted in good faith.

Eureka Springs

Sales Company v. Ward, 226 Ark. 424, 290 S.W.2d 434.
At trial, the Plaintiff, Richard Moffitt, testified that he
was the owner of the truck and gave the title to Jim Jeffries as
collateral for a loan so that his truck could be repaired.

(Trial

Transcript p. 21). He testified that he did not sell or give the
truck to Jeffries. Because Jeffries7 conduct consisted of a theft
of the truck, Moffitt was not divested of his ownership status. In
light of the above, Richard Moffitt certainly had a legal and
factual basis on which to ground his assertion that he still
"owned" the truck.
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B.

FRAUD

Moffitts' cause of action for fraud is based on Barr's representation that he was an officer of the law, and that he had a
"Repossession Order".

(Trial Transcript p. 29-30) Such misrepre-

sentations give factual credence to Moffitt/s fraud cause of action
and cannot be considered "frivolous".
C.

ARTICLE 9

Section 70A-9-503, 507 of the Utah Code provides a cause of
action

against those who breach

collateral.

the peace when

repossessing

Contrary to Barr's assertions, a security agreement

does not have to be in writing to be enforceable.

Section 70A-9-

102(1) (a) provides that "except as otherwise provided,,., this
chapter applies to any transaction (regardless of its form) which
is intended to create a security interest in personal property...
11

. The Moffitt,s cause of action was, therefore, well grounded in

law and fact.
D.

BATTERY

Both Shirley and Richard Moffitt testified that Barr drew a
gun and held it in a very close proximity to Richard Moffitt's
head.

Testimony was also uncontroverted that there was physical

contact leading up to the incident in which Barr drew his gun.
(Trial Transcript p. 25-27, 57-59).
Moffitts' allegation
occurred

when

the

Based on these facts, the

that the harmful and offensive touching
Defendant

held

and

drew

his

gun

at

the

Plaintiff's head was not frivolous or without legal or factual
basis.
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3.

The Moffitts' claims were brought in good faith.

The most obvious reason that Barr cannot recover attorney fees
under UCA §78-27-56 is a lack of any evidence that the Moffitts'
lawsuit was brought in anything other than good faith.

There is

absolutely no evidence that the Moffitts brought their lawsuit
maliciously or with the intent to defraud or take unconscionable
advantage of Barr.
real

incident

The Moffitts7 lawsuit, rather, is based on a

in which

Barr

used

deadly

force

against

the

Plaintiff, Richard Moffitt.
In addition, the case of Topik v. Thurber, 739 P.2d 1101 (Utah
1987) which
position.
because

is cited

in Barr's Brief, does not support his

In Topik, the Court awarded the Plaintiff attorney fees
the

falsehoods11.

Defendant's

testimony

consisted

of

"willful

In the instant case, there is no such evidence.

Finally, Barr's claim for attorney fees smells of hypocrisy
because all three of his counterclaims against the Moffitts were
dismissed by the Court and not submitted to the jury.

In April of

1990, this Court ruled that Barr's counterclaims of assault and
battery were time barred due to the statute of limitations.

In

addition, Barr's claim of "abuse of process" was dismissed during
trial when Barr indicated that the claim had not been seriously
pursued.
to

Using Barr's arguments, the Moffitts should be entitled

recover

their

attorney

fees

from

Barr

because

Barr's

counterclaims were definitely not grounded in fact. In short, Barr
seeks relief from the Court with dirty hands and should not be
entitled to ignore his own conduct in this litigation.
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4 • Barr's claim for attorney fees has already been dismissed.
On January 26, 1988, Barr filed a Counterclaim for "Abuse of
Process",

In his claim, Barr alleged that the Moffitts' lawsuit

was brought "in bad faith, without any reasonable or probable
cause, but was brought to harass the Defendant."

Barr requested

that the Court award him his attorney fees and other damages.
During trial, the Moffitts moved for a dismissal of the "Abuse
of Process" claims.

In response, Mr. Caston, attorney for Barr,

stateed: "... We are not pursuing our abuse of process claim
today."

(Trial Transcript p. 127).

Because Barr's claim for attorney fees was dismissed at trial,
the issue of attorney fees is not proper for review.
CONCLUSION
The objections that Barr has raised to this proceeding were
caused by his own fault and neglect.

Barr did not plead the

defense of self-defense, did not object when the Court failed to
instruct the jury on this defense, did not move for an amendment of
the pleadings to conform with the evidence and should therefore be
barred from raising "self-defense" at this time.

Contrary to his

arguments, there was substantial evidence to support the verdict of
the jury.

The placing of a gun against another's head is not an

incident to be taken lightly and the jury did not do so. They sent
a message to Mr. Barr that his conduct would not be tolerated in
our society.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower

Court should be affirmed and Defendant's appeal dismissed.

27

DATED this

o/

day of April, 1991.
KIPP & CHRISTIAN, P.C.

^ JAMES B. HANKS
Attorney for Plaintiffs
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Brief was mailed, postage prepaid on the <~X~~\ day of
April, 1991, to the following:
PETER STIRBA
BARBARA ZIMMERMAN
STIRBA & HATHAWAY
215 South State Street, Suite 1150
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C
ATTORNEYS

AT LAW

CITY CENTRE I . # 3 3 0
175 E A S T 4 0 0 S O U T H
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8"»l II - 2 3 l «
(80I) 521-3773

Attorney for P l a i n t i f f s
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RICHARD MOFFITT and SHIRLEY
MOFFITT,

MOTION IN LIMINE

Plaintiffs,
vs

Case No. 870907265CV

ROBERT E. BARR, dba AMERICAN
RECOVERY SERVICE,
Judge Pat B. Brian
Defendants,
Plaintiffs, by and through their attorney, James B.
Hanks of Kipp and Christian, P.C, move the Court for an
Order

requiring

the Defendant

to limit

the testimony

in

his case to those matters which will support the defenses
set

forth

in his answer, and no others.

the Defendant
or

argument

should

In particular,

not be entitled to produce evidence

concerning

self-defense

pled in Defendants answer.

because

it

was

A copy of Defendant's answer

is attached as Exhibit "A".
DATED this

/ ^

not

day of June-, 1990.

Qfa**Jy-buJ>-

,^ames B. Hanks
Attorney for Plaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I HEREBY

CERTIFY

of the foregoing Motion
the

that

a true and correct

copy

in Limine, was hand-delivered on

' *-~ day of June, 1990, to the following:
Harry Caston, Esq.
McKay, Burton & Thurman
1200 Kennecott Building
10 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
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>RNEYS AT LAW
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PETER STIRBA (3118)
R. BRET JENKINS (5094)
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN
Attorneys for Defendant
1200 Kennecott Building
10 East South Temple Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone (801) 521-4135
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RICHARD MOFFITT and SHIRLEY
MOFFITT,

:
:

ANSWER AND ..COUNTERCLAIM

:

Civil No. C87-07265

Plaintiffs,
vs.
ROBERT E. BARR dba AMERICAN
RECOVERY SERVICE,
Defendant.
The

:
:

Defendant,

Robert

Barr,

by

and

through

his

attorney of record, answer Plaintiffs' Complaint as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE
1.

Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for which relief

can be granted.
SECOND DEFENSE
The

Defendant

answers

the

Plaintiffs'

numbered

allegations listed in their Complaint as follows:
2.

The Defendant is without sufficient knowledge to

form an opinion as to the allegations in paragraphs 1 and 2 of
Plaintiffs' Complaint and therefore denies.

nn^oH

3.

The Defendant admits the allegations contained in

paragraph 3 of the Complaint,
4.

j

The Defendant denies the allegations in paragraphs

4 and 5 of the Complaint,
5.

The Defendant is without sufficient knowledge to

form an opinion as to the allegations in paragraph 6 of the
Complaint and therefore denies.
6.
7, 8, 9,

)

The Defendant denies the allegations of paragraphs

10,

11,

12,

13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and

18 of the

Plaintiffs' Complaint.
7.
form

The Defendant is without sufficient knowledge to

an opinion

as to

the allegation

in paragraph

19 that

Shirley Moffitt is the wife of the Plaintiff Richard Moffitt,
and therefore denies.
8.

The Defendant denies the remainder of paragraph 19

of Plaintiffs1 Complaint.
9.

The Defendant denies the allegations in paragraphs

20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30 and 31 of the
Plaintiffs' Complaint.
10.

_

The Defendant denies the allegations contained in

paragraphs 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43 and 44
of the Plaintiffs' Complaint.
11.

The Defendant

J
denies any other allegations not

expressly admitted to in this Answer.
THIRD DEFENSE
The Defendant affirmatively alleges as follows:
12.

The Plaintiffs' claims against the Defendant are

meritless and not brought in good faith.

noosa

J

13.

The Defendant is entitled to attorney's fees under

the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 78-27-56.
FIRST COUNTERCLAIM
(Abuse of Process)
1A.

The

Plaintiffs

originally

initiated

criminal

proceedings against the Defendant based on the same facts as
exist in this action.
15.

The Defendant was ultimately cleared of each of

the charges.
16.

The Plaintiffs then filed a civil lawsuit against

the Defendant in September of 1986 in Third District Court based
on the same facts.
17.

On December 1, 1986, the Honorable Judge Richard

Moffat dismissed the lawsuit.
18.

On or about November 5, 1987, the Plaintiffs filed

the present Complaint based on the same facts as existed in the
prior criminal action and civil suit and caused the Defendant to
be served with a Summons and copy of the Complaint on December
2, 1987.
19.
wrongfully

The

took

a

Plaintiffs
certain

alleged

1975 Kenworth

that

the

Defendant

truck, and in the

process, committed an assault, battery and other violations.
20.

The present lawsuit was brought by the Plaintiffs

in bad faith, without any reasonable or probable cause, but was
brought to harass the Defendant.
21.

In bringing

the lawsuit, the Plaintiffs acted

maliciously and with intent to injure the Defendant by harming

n^.noa

his good name and reputation through the use of the judicial
system.
22.

The actions of the Plaintiffs constitute an abuse

of the judicial system.
SECOND COUNTERCLAIM
(Assault)
23.

The Defendant had been hired to repossess a 1975

Kenworth Tractor from the Plaintiff.
24.

On

or

about

November

5, 1984, the Defendant,

Robert Barr, was attempting to repossess the Tractor, which was
located in front of the Plaintiffs' home.
25.
the front

During the procedure, the Defendant was sitting in

driver's

seat of the Tractor, and the Plaintiff,

Richard Moffitt, approached the Defendant in a violent and angry
manner, yelling at the Defendant that he was going to kill him.
26.

The

act

by

the

Plaintiff

of

approaching

the

Defendant in an angty, violent manner, while yelling that he was
going to "kill him" created reasonable apprehension and fear in
the Defendant of immediate harmful contact with his person.
27.
place

The Plaintiff's actions were intended by him to

the Defendant

in apprehension

and

fear of

immediate,

harmful contact.
28.

The acts of the Plaintiff caused the Defendant,

Robert Barr, severe emotional trauma and fear for his life for
which the Plaintiff has suffered irreparable damage.
THIRD COUNTERCLAIM
(Battery)
29.

While the Defendant, Robert Barr, was sitting in

001

the front seat of the tractor.

The Plaintiff brought about a

, harmful and offensive contact with the Defendant's person when
J he climbed onto the running board of the truck and physically \
knocked the Defendant out of the seat.
30.

!

The Plaintiff's actions were intended to bring |

about a harmful and offensive contact upon the Defendant.
31.

j

The act of the Plaintiff, Richard Moffitt, in I

I knocking the Defendant out of the driver's

seat caused the

Defendant extreme emotional distress and fear for his life and
caused the Defendant irreparable damages.
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays for relief as follows:

j

1.

Plaintiffs' action be dismissed.

I

2.

Defendant be awarded a sum of money for general

and special damages for the three counterclaims, in an amount to |
be determined at trial.
l

3.

Defendant be awarded punitive damages for each

counterclaim in the amount of $50,000.00.
4.

j

Defendant be awarded costs and attorney's fees i

associated with this lawsuit.
I

5.

j
I
For other appropriate relief the Court deems just I

and equitable.

j
!

J
DATED this

tb

day of December, 1987.
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN

PETER STIRBA

R. BR£J JENKINS
Attorriey^for Defendant

{

I
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I hereby

certify

a true

and

correct

copy

of the

foregoing ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM was mailed, postage prepaid,
to James B. Hanks, Esq., Gateway Park, Suite 300, 563 West 500
South, Bountiful, Utah, this 2?~

day of December, 1987.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RICHARD MOFFITT and SHIRLEY
MOFFITT,

ORDER GRANTING MOTION
IN LIMINE

Plaintiffs,
vs.
Case No. 870907265CV
ROBERT E. BARR, dba AMERICAN
RECOVERY SERVICE,

Judge Pat B. Brian

Defendants.
This matter having come before the Court on the
12th day of June, 1990 pursuant to Plaintiff's Motion in
Limine.
and

The Court,

being

fully

having

informed

heard

argument

from

in the premises,

counsel

orders the

Defendant to limit the presentation of evidence and argument
in his case to those matters concerning the defenses pled
in his answer.
not

to

In particular, the Defendant

produce

evidence

respecting

is ordered

the defense

self-defense.
DATED this

day of June, 1990.
~>

zjZZ^z

PAT B. BRIAN
District Court Judge

of

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I HEREBY
of

the

foregoing

hand-delivered

on

CERTIFY
Order

that

a true

Granting

the

day

Motion
of

and correct
in

Limine

June, 1990

to

copy
was
the

following:
Harry Caston, Esq.
McKay, Burton & Thurman
1200 Kennecott Building
10 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133

<D CHRISTIAN. P.C.
ORNEYS AT LAW
CENTRE I . # 3 3 0
lAST 4 0 0 SOUTH

-2-

KLT L A HE C I T Y ,
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PETER STIRBA (3118)
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN
Attorneys for Defendant
1200 Kennecott Building
10 East South Temple Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone (801) 521-4135
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RICHARD MOFFITT and SHIRLEY
MOFFITT,

:
AMENDED
: ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM

Plaintiffs,
vs.
:
ROBERT E. BARR dba AMERICAN
RECOVERY SERVICE,
Defendant.

Civil No. C87-07265
Judge Pat B. Brian

:
:

Defendant Robert E. Barr answers Plaintiffs' Complaint
as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE
Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for which relief can
be granted.
SECOND DEFENSE
The Defendant answers the Plaintiffs' numbered allegations listed in their Complaint as follows:
1.

The Defendant is without sufficient knowledge to

form an opinion as to the allegations in paragraphs 1 and 2 of
Plaintiffs' Complaint and therefore denies.

2.

The Defendant admits the allegations contained in

paragraph 3 of the Complaint.
3.

The Defendant denies the allegations in paragraphs

4 and 5 of the Complaint.
4.

The Defendant is without sufficient knowledge to

form an opinion as to the allegations in paragraph 6 of the
Complaint and therefore denies.
5.

The Defendant denies the allegations of paragraphs

7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18 of the Plaintiffs' Complaint.
6.

The Defendant is without sufficient knowledge to

form an opinion

as to the allegation

in paragraph

19 that

Shirley Moffitt is the wife of the Plaintiff Richard Moffitt,
and therefore denies.
7.

The Defendant denies the remainder of paragraph 19

of Plaintiffs" Complaint.
8.

I

The Defendant denies the allegations in paragraphs

20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30 and 31 of the Plain- I
! tiffs1 Complaint.
9.

The Defendant denies the allegations contained in

(paragraphs 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43 and 44
of the Plaintiffs' Complaint.
10.

The Defendant denies any other allegations not

expressly admitted to in this Answer.
THIRD DEFENSE
Plaintiffs' claims are barred under the doctrine of res
judicia.

FOURTH DEFENSE
Plaintiffs claims are barred under the doctrine of laches.
FIFTH DEFENSE
Plaintiffs1

claims

should

be

dismissed

for

failure

to

prosecute.
SIXTH DEFENSE
The Plaintiffs1 claims against the Defendant are meritless
and not brought in good faith and " Defendant is entitled to
attorney's fees under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 78-27-56.
SEVENTH DEFENSE
Under Utah Code Annotated §78-12-29, Plaintiffs' claims
for assault and battery are barred by statute of limitations.
EIGHTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff claims under their third and seventh causes of
action are barred by Section 78-12-26 U.C.A. (1953), as amended.
NINTH DEFENSE
Plaintiffs have no standing to bring claims for trespass to chattels and conversion since Plaintiffs did not own or
have a possessory right in the vehicle which was repossessed.
FIRST COUNTERCLAIM
(Abuse of Process)
1.

The

Plaintiffs

originally

initiated

criminal

proceedings against the Defendant based on the same facts as
exist in this action.
2.
the charges.

The Defendant was ultimately cleared of each of

3.

The Plaintiffs then filed a civil lawsuit against

the Defendant in February of 1985 in Third District Court based
on the same facts.
4.

On December 1, 1986, the Honorable Judge Richard

Moffat dismissed the lawsuit.
5.

On or about November 5, 1987, the Plaintiffs filed

the present Complaint based on the same facts as existed in the
prior criminal action" and civil suit and caused the Defendant to
be served with a Summons and copy of the Complaint on December
2, 1987.
6.

The Plaintiffs alleged that the Defendant wrong-

fully took a certain 1975 Kenworth truck, and in the process,
committed an assault, battery and other violations.
7.

The present lawsuit was brought by the Plaintiffs

in bad faith, without any reasonable or probable cause, but was
brought to harass the Defendant.
8.

In bringing

the

lawsuit, the Plaintiffs

acted

maliciously and with intent to injure the Defendant by harming
his good name and reputation through the use of the judicial
system.
9.

The actions of the Plaintiffs constitute an abuse

of the judicial system, are willful, wanton and malicious and in
reckless disregard of Defendant's rights and Defendant should be
awarded punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial.

SECOND COUNTERCLAIM
(Assault)
10.

The Defendant had been hired to repossess a 1975

Kenworth Tractor from the Plaintiff.
11.

On or about November

5, 1984, the Defendant,

Robert Barr, was attempting to repossess the Tractor, which was
located in front of the Plaintiffs1 home.
12.

During the procedure, the Defendant was sitting in

the front driver's

seat of the Tractor, and

the Plaintiff,

Richard Moffitt, approached the Defendant in a violent and angry
manner, yelling at the Defendant that he was going to kill him.
13.

The

act

by

the

Plaintiff

of

approaching

the

Defendant in an angry, violent manner, while yelling that he was
going to "kill himft created reasonable apprehension and fear in
the Defendant of immediate harmful contact with his person.
14.
place

The Plaintiff's actions were intended by him to

the Defendant

in apprehension

and

fear

of immediate,

harmful contact.
15.

The acts of the Plaintiff caused the Defendant,

Robert Barr, severe emotional trauma and fear for his life for
which the Plaintiff has suffered general and special damages.
16.

As a result of Plaintiff's willful, wanton and

malicious conduct, Defendant should be compensated in punitive
damages in an amount to be determined at trial.
THIRD COUNTERCLAIM
(Battery)
17.

While the Defendant, Robert Barr, was sitting in

the front seat of the tractor.

The Plaintiff brought about a
r, I . 4 1 * A...^

Q

harmful and offensive contact with the Defendant's person when
he climbed onto the running board of the truck and physically
knocked the Defendant out of the seat.
18.

The Plaintiff's actions were intended to bring

about a harmful and offensive contact upon the Defendant.
19.
knocking

The act of the Plaintiff, Richard Moffitt, in

the Defendant out of the driver's

seat

caused the

Defendant extreme emotional distress and fear for his life and
caused the Defendant general and special damages.
20.

As a result of Plaintiff's willful, wanton and

malicious conduct, Defendant should be compensated in punitive
damages in an amount to be determined at trial.
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays for relief as follows:
1.

Plaintiffs' action be dismissed.

2.

Defendant be awarded a sum of money for general

and special damages for the three counterclaims, in an amount to
be determined at trial.
3.

Defendant be awarded punitive damages for each

counterclaims in the amount of $100,000.00.
4.

Defendant be awarded costs and attorney's fees

associated with this lawsuit.
5.

For other appropriate relief the Court deems just

and equitable.
DATED this ^(g

day of January, AS88.
McKAY^BURTON & \THURMAN

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby

certify

a

true

and

correct

copy

of the

foregoing AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM was mailed, postage
prepaid, to James B. Hanks, Esq,, Gateway Park, Suite 300, 563
West 500 South, Bountiful, Utah, this

^

^

day of J anuary,

1988.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

20

If you find in favor of the Plaintiff Richard Moffit, on
any of he* claims, then you must assess her damages which may be
actual or nominal.
To assess any actual damages, you must find from a
preponderance of the evidence that the Plaintiff sustained
actual damages as a proximate result of the claimed assault
and/or battery.
To the extent that any actual damages have been so
established by the evidence, you shall assess as the Plaintiff's
actual damages, an amount which will fairly and justly
compensate him for:
1.

Any physical discomfort or inconveniences she may
have sustained;

2.

Any physical illness or injury she may have sustained;

3.

Any emotional distress, fear, anxiety, embarrassment,
humiliation or loss of reputation she may have

n*^.A ^ o

